The Commander Series Forum

Another good book I took with me on my recent hols was:

“Red Storm Over the Balkans” by David M. Glantz (Univ Press of Kansas, 2007), subtitled: “The Failed Soviet Invasion of Romania, Spring 1944”.

This book of 9 chapters, is 381 pages long with a further 35 pages of notes which include translations of soviet documents and references to sources but also occasional additional notes sometimes about forces or tank numbers. There is also a very useful index. Glantz is writing both a historiography (ie writing based on a critical examination of sources) and a narrative (who did what, when etc). Initially the historiography is laboured as Glantz batters down the accepted ideas and beliefs that, he says, both Soviet propaganda, and German sources had created, post WW2, that there was no major planned offensives on Romanian-Ukrainian border in the Spring of 1944. Glantz goes on to describe both Soviet and German offensives in this frontier zone. Glantz notes that this belies the German histories focus on Hitler’s (failed – although not always failed) use of ‘stand fast’ directives on the Eastern Front. Glantz makes it clear that this Soviet activity was to cover up a failing on their part – ie the failure to invade Romania and take Romania out of the war in Spring 1944. Glantz notes that Russian policy was to conduct a broad advance on all fronts, with the hope of finding and exploiting a weak point, whereas later Russian histories suggested that their policy was in fact to develop a narrow front aimed at Berlin. Why German histories might have focused on maintaining a ‘narrow’ front presentation of the wars development is suggested but not developed coherently by Glantz. Is it that German histories have shifted attention away from what Glantz describes as the Soviet success, whereby the Soviet broad brush approach “destroyed or severely damaged at least 16 German divisions and eliminated hundreds of thousands of soldiers from the Wehrmacht’s order pf battle, either by encirclement or sheer combat attrition, and reduced another 60 German divisions to only skeletal strength” (page xi) across the whole Eastern Front?

The chapters often follow a format of introducing the commanders, their career histories, and their forces, then a description of their actions and analysis of their impact, and review of how this compares to what was said at the time or later.

There are many potentially useful maps but often they are printed in such small space, and poor resolution as to hinder there usefulness. There are few, if any, references I could find to the sources of the maps. Many appear to be copies of details from either German or Soviet military maps from the period. There is much detail about organisation on strategic level and about the movement of grant tactical formations between different Russian “Fronts” (collection of army groups) and German use of Kampfgruppen, ie combat- or battle-groups, and how these are constantly being reformed or divided and shifted from one point of critical-mass on one battlefield to another battlefield. Sometimes this information about movement and density of commands is over-whelming to the brain! This reminds me of the huge scale of operations on what we know as the ‘Eastern Front’ and this book is dealing just with its southern flank!

Glantz has, I believe, built a strong reputation on examining Soviet documents, and comparing these to accounts (published or otherwise) from German and Soviet (ie Russian, Ukrainian, Siberian etc) participants. He clearly wants to write a history from the Soviet viewpoint, which doesn’t mean he is writing what a Soviet Patriot would want to hear. (This appears to be to counter the German led views about what happened on the Eastern Front that came out of western Allied sources debriefing captured German officers after the war, and Germans coming to terms with the Eastern Front, as well as western powers coming to terms with the ‘Cold War’. We hear from German and Soviet participants and eye witnesses as Glantz tries to write a clear account of what happened which he sometimes acknowledges is difficult to do in a balanced way as many of the witnesses died in action or post war in gulags.

Glantz clearly spells out the effects of the “rasputitsa” (spring rain and mud) on both strategy and tactical manoeuvre.

There are many ideas for games. It also provides many thoughts for game rules and reviewing existing games rules. The following is a brief sample only.

There are ‘small’ battles like the one on 28March 1944, when 23rd Panzer Division and Grossdeutschland Panzer Grenadier Division re-take Pyrlitsa from Soviet 2nd Tank Army, (see page 30); while on the same day 24th Panzer Division and Romanian 5th Cavalry Division also counter-attack north of Iasi; where Glantz talks of Rotmistrov’s 5th Guards Tank Corps, already “reduced to a mere handful of tanks and self-propelled guns as a result of previous fighting” (p31) yet tried to maintain offensive in face of German’s skilful withdrawal by German 8th Army. While also describing how Soviet force of riflemen from 4th Guards army, and units from Selivanov’s cavalry corps, were supported in their drive against Group von Knobelsdorff (from XXXX Panzer Corps) with just eight T34 tanks and two SU85 self propelled guns. Resources were stretched on both sides of the battle-front.

Later we hear of the break out from Odessa by German forces, (pages 35/6). This could be the basis for a mini-campaign, like the “Road to” miniature based campaigns, often recorded on other WW2 game sites. As such it could provide the inspiration for a series of connected games where German forces attempt to burst out of the developing siege and make their way to their own fast retreating lines.

There is the German encirclement of the Soviet attackers at the first battle of Tirgu-Frumos, 9-12th April1944, (see pages 62-9); and the subsequent counter attacks by the Germans at Totoesti and Podu Isloaie, (see pages 69-70). We have played this at my old club, Crosby Wargames Group, on Merseyside, were history was repeated along with much ‘tactical’ unease (Clauswitz’s friction?) as players on both sides tackled the umpire led battle developments.

There is an excellent skirmish game to be had from the landing of a Soviet light plane with a staff officer with full briefings on Soviet plans, whom the German captured with ease, (see page 74). Perhaps a rescue mission could be launched?

There is the fighting that began at Critesti between Soviets and Romanian’s 8th Infantry division that rolled on, and which both sides reinforced, the Romanians with their tough 20th Mountain Division for instance, and the fight broadened along the frontline and Germans sent a kampfgruppe from SS Totenkopf Panzer Division to forestall a breakthrough (see pages 75/6).

The German retreat and crossing of the Dnestr river could also provide an enjoyable scenario, (see page 122) where German Sixth Army traffic had been “jammed up for weeks”, at the railroad and road bridge west of Tiraspol, and five smaller bridges were added to aid the retreat.

Then there are the battles taking place in the bends of river Dnestr where either Soviets created a crossing and bridgehead over the Dnestr and the Germans attacked to destroy these, or the Germans maintained a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Dnestr and the Soviets tried to eliminate them, (see for example pages 125-7 and 291-304).

There are many German counter attacks, like the fighting near Tirgu-Frumos described on pages 181-8, to restore better defence lines and disrupt Soviet build up. And the second battle of Tirgu-Frumos, from 9th to 12April, 1944, (described on pages 215-274), which is a mini-campaign in itself. Here there is the deliberate use of smoke screen by the Soviets, and the often ineffective ‘carpet’ bombardment from artillery (including “Katiushas” rockets) and air by Soviet forces, to counter German defences (like wire and minefield, as well as trenches, pillboxes, dugouts and anti-tank ditches or AFVs dug in!) these bombardments effectively cut telephone lines leaving the Germans reliant on their radios, which they saw as back up for their phones! There is the effective use of concealment by German defenders and an example of a battery of German guns, 88mm it appears, holding fire in concealment till enemy tanks were “about 30 metres” away then each gun knocking out their chosen target! The Soviets deployed the new IS2 (Josef Stalin IIs) tanks and a company of Tiger Is opened up on them: “One could clearly see the shells were striking the tanks, but all bounced off!” – that must have been a new experience for these Tiger tank crews? The Tiger Is battalion commander, Oberstleutnant Baumungk, was present and he ordered the Tigers, “10 – 12 in number” to attack! The Tiger Is advanced to between 1800 and 2000 metres and opened fire again. This time four enemy tanks were brewed up and the others departed! Oberstleutnant Baumungk was not satisfied, he ordered a company of Panzer IV tanks to swing round, pursue and destroy these escaping Soviet tanks!! His PzIVs managed to approach from cover, to within 1000 metres of the rear of the retreating Soviets and engaged them. General Manteuffel summed up the new IS2s in following manner [translated into US English as]: “we later found out, they were the new ‘Stalin’ tanks: big gun, heavy armor, low silhouette, but also slow and not maneuverable enough. In my opinion, the crews were also not sufficiently familiar with the new vehicle.” (page 228) There is much more like the use of Soviet air reconnaissance (page 258) and later Soviet evaluation of this series of engagements, describing their poor cooperation between Soviet air force and ground forces, with added problem of Soviet ground attacks bombing their “own forces’ own combat formations, not only along the forward edge, but also up to five kilometers (3 miles) into the depths” ie. behind the frontline!

This is a book you can dip into for different actions, as I have done in the past, or read in its entirety, as I have done recently, if you can avoid getting brain jam following the many descriptions or the historiography, its well worth the effort.

Carl Luxford

Great review, Carl - thanks

That really is a top-notch review Carl - appreciated